Rutte: Nato Summit to approve raising benchmark for defence investment to 5% of GDP

Nato Allies will approve a their summit in The Hague on June 24 and 25 major new defence investment plan, raising the benchmark for defence investment to five per cent of GDP, Secretary General Mark Rutte told a news conference on June 23.

This will be agreed together with a concerted effort to ramp up defence industry across Nato, increasing security and creating jobs, Rutte said.

There will also be a continued focus on support for Ukraine alongside the pursuit of a just and lasting end to Russia’s war of aggression.

Rutte said that the new defence investment plan will be “decisive” to ensuring effective deterrence.

While the details of national capability targets are classified, he called for a five-fold increase in air defence capabilities, thousands more tanks and armoured vehicles and millions of rounds of artillery ammunition to help keep Nato’s one billion citizens safe.

Speaking ahead of the Nato Summit Defence Industry Forum on June 24, Rutte urged Allies to work with industry to expand their defence industrial base warning that “there is not nearly enough supply to meet our increased demand on either side of the Atlantic”.

“By investing more and producing more, we build a stronger Nato” he said.

Strengthening partnerships will remain a key focus for the Alliance, with the Summit providing the opportunity to engage with Ukraine, Nato partners in the Indo-Pacific, and the leadership of the European Union, Rutte said.

Finally, on Ukraine, he said: “We must continue to make sure Ukraine has what it needs to defend today and deter in the future. Our support for Ukraine is unwavering and will persist.

Meanwhile a poll done in 12 European countries by the European Council on Foreign Relations, the results of which were released on June 23, has found that there is widespread agreement in Europe that defence spending must rise.

Majorities in Poland (70 per cent), Denmark (70 per cent), the UK (57 per cent), Estonia (56 per cent) and Portugal (54 per cent), support (either ‘strongly’ or ‘somewhat’) the idea of increasing national defence spending—with majorities in Denmark and Estonia (the only two countries where the other question was asked) also in favour of increasing defence spending to five per cent of national GDP.

Pluralities in Romania (50 per cent), Spain (46 per cent), France (45 per cent), Hungary (45 per cent), Germany (47 per cent), and Switzerland (40 per cent) also expressed support for increased defence spending.

Italy, however, is an outlier to this trend, with a 57 per cent majority either ‘somewhat’ or ‘strongly’ opposed, and only 17 per cent supporting a hike in defence spending.

Majorities also favour reintroducing mandatory military service. Respondents in France (62 per cent), Germany (53 per cent), and Poland (51 per cent) are the strongest supporters for such a move, with the softest support coming from Hungary (32 per cent), Spain (37 per cent) and the UK (37 per cent) (this question was not asked in Denmark, Estonia, and Switzerland because military service is already mandatory there).

Those within the age groupings 60-69 and 70+ are keenest on the idea of mandatory military service (with 54 per cent and 58 per cent, respectively, indicating their support).

This plummets, however, when put to the youngest demographic group (those ages 18-29). On average, just 27 per cent of this group—who are of age to serve in any armed conflict—expressed support, while a majority, 57 per cent, indicated that they would oppose such a move.

The poll found that Europeans are committed to Ukraine, irrespective of US policy.

ECFR data shows that majorities or pluralities in 11 of the 12 countries surveyed are against the idea of Europe withdrawing its military support for Ukraine, pushing Ukraine to give up on territory occupied by Russia, or lifting economic sanctions on Russia—irrespective of a U.S. policy shift across these points.

Respondents in Denmark (78 per cent), Portugal (74 per cent), the UK (73 per cent), and Estonia (68 per cent) are the staunchest supporters of continued military support in the event of a U.S. withdrawal. Similarly, those in Denmark (72 per cent), Portugal (71 per cent), the United Kingdom (69 per cent), and Estonia (68 per cent) are the most opposed to the idea of pushing Ukraine to give up occupied territory, if the US adopted such an approach; and are also the strongest opponents of lifting economic sanctions against Russia, if the U.S.  behaved in this manner (Denmark, 77 per cent; the UK, 71 per cent; Estonia, 69 per cent; and Poland, 68 per cent).

US President Donald Trump’s hostility towards Europe has given rise to anti-American sentiment. This is particularly true in Denmark, where 86 per cent of respondents believe the U.S. political system is ‘broken’, and where the share of population that consider Trump’s re-election a bad thing for American citizens has increased from 54 per cent to 76 per cent per cent in just six months.

A similar picture emerges among Portuguese citizens, where 70 per cent view the U.S. political system, today, as ‘broken’, compared to just 60 per cent, when ECFR asked the same question in November 2020, following Joe Biden’s election victory.

In the UK, and Germany, majorities of 74 per cent and 67 per cent also think the U.S system is broken. And, even in traditionally pro-American Poland, the share of citizens sharing this view has risen from 25 per cent to 36 per cent since November 2020.

There is scepticism about whether the EU can effectively decouple from the US on defence and security.

Respondents in Denmark and Portugal are the most optimistic about achieving this, with 52 per cent and 50 per cent of citizens, respectively, believing it is ‘possible’ for the EU to become independent of the US on defence and security in the next five years.

Scepticism is the most pronounced in Italy and Hungary, where 54 per cent and 51 per cent, respectively, see EU autonomy on security and defence as ‘very difficult’ or ‘practically impossible’ to achieve in the next five years.

Elsewhere, respondents are torn, including in Romania (45 per cent think it is possible vs. 39 per cent think it is difficult or impossible), France (44 per cent vs. 39 per cent), Germany (44 per cent vs. 45 per cent), Poland (38 per cent vs. 48 per cent), Estonia (41 per cent vs. 49 per cent) and Spain (43 per cent vs. 47 per cent).

Europeans are also sceptical about whether the EU can put aside its internal differences and become a global power, capable of competing economically with the US and China. Belief that the EU can become such a player is soft—and a minority view—in 11 of the 12 countries polled by ECFR (with Danes being the sole outliers in their optimism).

Many also harbour the belief that the Transatlantic Alliance will be repaired, once Trump leaves office. There is a widespread expectation that the transatlantic relationship will improve once Trump leaves office, with this view most evident in Denmark (62 per cent), Portugal (54 per cent), Germany and Spain (52 per cent), and France (50 per cent).

This view is the weakest in Hungary (20 per cent) and Romania (28 per cent), where relatively many people—24 per cent and 19 per cent respectively—believe Trump has not really damaged the transatlantic relationship.

Only a minority in every country—and 22 per cent on average, across 12 countries polled—are of an opinion that not only Trump has damaged the relationship between Europe and the USA but also that ‘the damage will probably last even once Trump has left office’.

Besides, the prevailing view, across the 12 countries surveyed by ECFR, is that Europe can continue to rely on US. nuclear deterrence (48 per cent of citizens, on average across polled markets, share this view), maintain the US military presence on the continent (55 per cent), and avoid a trade war with Washington (54 per cent).

Trump 2.0 has prompted a revolution in not just Europe’s geopolitical—but also in the political identity of its main political parties.

Trump’s return to power appears to have driven an outbreak of ‘political cross-dressing’ in Europe. Supporters of populist parties are no longer exclusively against the status-quo—they are now in favour of the Trumpian counter-project.

Those who back mainstream parties are no longer simply in favour of the status-quo—they are now increasingly drawing energy from being defenders of national sovereignty against Trump.

As a result, the European public is currently strongly polarised in its perceptions of the US political system.

For example, voters of the right-wing parties, Fidesz (Hungary), PiS (Poland), Brothers of Italy (Italy), AfD (Germany) and Vox (Spain), have a predominantly positive view of America—while the mainstream electorates in their countries hold a mostly negative view of the U.S. political system.

Furthermore, being able to treat the US. as the model appears to allow voters of the far-right to become even more outspoken in their criticism of the EU.

This represents a huge leap for supporters of some populist parties—like those of PiS (Poland), Vox (Spain) or Chega (Portugal)—where the perception that the EU is broken has now become majoritarian, after being previously held only be a minority of their voters.

Conversely, voters for mainstream parties appear to be rallying around the European flag—most visibly in Germany and in France.

The result of these various changes in public opinion is the emergence of a reverse relationship in the perception of the U.S. and the EU, which was not there before.